




For the transition to a market economy, several countries in Eastern Europe,
which formerly had centrally planned economies and decided in the past few
years to adopt new economic systems, have enacted or are considering enacting
new laws on bankruptcy.' These new laws could facilitate the restructuring or
liquidation of existing insolvent state enterprises, which are currently an important
obstacle to structural reform of the economy, as well as provide for future needs
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1. The need for bankruptcy laws in these countries is widely recognized. Writes one analyst:
Bankruptcy as practiced in market economies was unknown and unneeded in centrally
planned ones. In Central and Eastern Europe, debtors and creditors were generally
arms of the state or ultimately supported by the state, and thus inherent conflicts of
interest that drive bankruptcy proceedings did not exist. . . . Measures in lieu of
bankruptcy, including financial "rehabilitation" and "compulsory settlement" (i.e.
pro-rate debt reduction) were relied upon to keep ailing firms alive and preserve
employment.
• . . As the private sector grows, true conflicts of interest will emerge among debtors
and various categories of claimants, including banks, suppliers, the government (as
tax collector), and shareholders.
CHERYL W. GRAY, EVOLVING LEGAL FRAMEWORKS FOR PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT IN CENTRAL
AND EASTERN EUROPE 10-11 (World Bank Discussion Papers No. 209, 1993) [hereinafter GRAY,
EVOLVING LEGAL FRAMEWORKS].
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to deal with insolvencies in an effective and efficient manner. 2 They also could
enhance the prospects for privatization of restructured enterprises and enable
banks to improve the quality of their assets by realizing some nonperforming
assets. Consequently, the prospects for the restructuring and privatization of
banks would also be improved. There is also scope for out-of-court settlements
other than pursuant to a bankruptcy law, which are particularly appropriate when
the debtor and significant creditors are owned by the state.
This article considers the bankruptcy laws of the Czech Republic, Hungary,
and Poland, the three countries in Eastern Europe that have made the most prog-
ress towards transition to market economies. 3 The laws' design and experience
2. Bankruptcy is one of the most contentious areas of legal reform in the CEE countries.
This is in large part because of the conflict and confusion between two different
sets of potential "users" of bankruptcy procedures. This first is the large group of
state-owned enterprises in need of restructuring or liquidation .... However, the
social costs of widespread liquidation of these firms are often considered to be too
high to let bankruptcy proceed unabated. The second group is the newly emerging
private sector, whether enterprises or banks. For this group, bankruptcy law ...
increases the potential for debt collection and thus facilitates the flow of private credit
in an economy. Such credit is essential for the success of new private business.
Id. at 11.
In Poland, liquidation of state-owned enterprises is conducted pursuant to the bankruptcy law and
the Law on Privatization of State-Owned Enterprises Act of 12 July 1990, as amended [Ustawa z
dnia 12 lipca 1990 r.o. prywatyzacji przedsleblorstw panstwowcyhz, z pozniejszymi zmianami],
DZIENNIK USTAW [JOURNAL OF LAWS] [Dz.U.] No. 51, item 298 (1990). Under the privatization
law, creditors are paid in full and this is not intended to address insolvency. See Jerzy.Rajski,
Privatization in Poland, in PRIVATIZATION IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE 35, 48 (Peter Sardevi6
ed., 1992) (describing the process of liquidation of state-owned property); Eva & Wladyslaw Jerma-
kowicz, Approaching Business Valuation in the Polish Privatization Programme, in VALUATION AND
PRIVATIZATION 25, 29 (Enery Quifiones et al. eds., 1993); see also PIERRE GUISLAIN, DIVESTITURE OF
STATE ENTERPRISES 22 (World Bank Technical Paper No. 186, 1992) (discussing the liquidation or
bankruptcy of state-owned enterprises).
3. The Czech Republic's bankruptcy act [hereinafter CL], which has been amended since its
adoption in July 1991, is the Act on Bankruptcy and Settlements, No. 328/1991 Coll. of 11 July
1991. While the CL generally applies to insolvencies of individuals as well as enterprises, this article
focuses on the application of the laws to business insolvencies.
Hungary's insolvency law was passed in 1991 [hereinafter Pre-amendment HL] and amended in July
1993 [hereinafter HL]. Law IL of 1991 on Bankruptcy Procedures, Liquidation Procedures and Final
Settlement (as modified), Nr. IV./ 19, HUNGARIAN RULES OF LAW IN FORCE 1225 (1993); see Timothy
John Smith, Hungary Irons out Insolvency Wrinkles, 28 INT'L CORP. L. 58 (September 1993); Amend-
ments to Bankruptcy Law Discussed, F.B.1.S., EAST EUROPE DAILY REP., Aug. 24, 1993, at 14. For
a historical perspective on bankruptcy in Hungary and an analysis of the 1986 Bankruptcy Act, see
Andrds Tibori, Bankruptcy and the Law 28, (No. 105) NEW HUNGARIAN Q., Spring 1987, at 59. For
a brief overview of the 1986 Bankruptcy Act and a detailed analysis of both the causes of the financial
difficulties of firms and methods for resolving them, see G. Papanek, Hungarian Enterprises Surviving
Critical Financial Situations 37 (3-4) ACTA OECONOMICA 305 (1986).
Poland's bankruptcy act [hereinafter PL], originally a presidential order of 1934, was amended
in 1990. Bankruptcy Act, Dz.U. No. 14, item 87 (1990) (Regulation by the President of the Republic
of Poland of 24 October 1934, as amended). Thus, while the 1934 law provides the substance of
this bankruptcy law, the fact that it was amended as part of the commercial law modernization in
1990 signifies legislative ratification of the prior rules. See Stephen Baister, Corporate Insolvency-
Eastern Approaches, 5 INSOLVENCY L. & PRACTICE 109 (1989) (briefly describing the laws of Poland,
Hungary, Yugoslavia, and the USSR). For an overview of the 1934 presidential order, see CHERYL
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in implementation, both successful and unsuccessful, could be useful for other
countries that contemplate adopting new bankruptcy laws.
The Czech law and to a lesser extent the Polish law appear to be inspired by the
German insolvency laws (which will be superseded by a new law in 1999 that was
recently approved by the legislature) perhaps because of a desire to emulate an
important element of the commercial law system of an economically successful
West Germany.4 Many provisions of these laws are identical to the German laws.
In light of the special needs in Eastern and Central Europe (and in the former Soviet
Union) for the restructuring of large, financially distressed, state enterprises, it is
questionable whether the initial bankruptcy laws for these countries should have
followed so faithfully the laws of a developed country. Indeed, the German laws
will be replaced because of perceived deficiencies: the lack of practical application
of the provisions for financial reorganization, as distinguished from liquidation,
because of the limited impact of the laws on secured creditors.' The German law
also contains provisions that preclude an enterprise from conducting normal busi-
ness operations while the restructuring is developed. 6
Certain other provisions of the prior German law also appear to be inappropriate
for economies in transition. Since the volume of insolvent enterprises in econo-
mies in transition is great7 and disproportionate to the administrative capabilities
GRAY ET AL., THE LEGAL FRAMEWORKS FOR PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT IN A TRANSITIONAL
ECONOMY: THE CASE OF POLAND 22-25 (World Bank Working Papers Series No. 800, 1991) [herein-
after THE CASE OF POLAND]. Furthermore, additional laws provide for a compromise between individ-
ual debtors and their creditors and for restructuring of enterprises. Law on Mutual Agreement (1934)
and Law on Financial Restructuring of Enterprises and Banks [0 Restrukturyzacji Finansowej Przed-
siebiorstw I Bank6w Oraz 0 Zmianie Niekt6rych Ustaw], Dz.U. No. 18, item 82 (1993).
4. Konkursordnung, II B 50 (Dec. 1982), applicable in the former West Germany; see also
Gesamtvollstreckungsordnung, BGB1. I (June 1991), applicable in the former East Germany.
In Poland, the Law on the Procedure for Mutual Agreement, which was passed in 1934, also was
modeled after a 1927 German statute. See THE CASE OF POLAND, supra note 3, at 23 n.28.
5. In April and July 1994, the German legislature approved a new bankruptcy law that will be
in effect from January 1, 1999. The text of the law is expected to be published in the Bundesgestezblatt
in November 1994. See Germany to Revise Insolvency Law, BUSINESS EUROPE, Nov. 29, 1991
(announcing the introduction of a bill with reorganization provisions).
6. A prominent member of the German bankruptcy bar has indicated that only about I % of
business bankruptcies are resolved by a judicial composition, which is the main law in Germany for
restructuring of a debtor enterprise.
7. In Hungary, in part due to the mandatory filing requirement contained in the prior version
of the recently amended bankruptcy law, the number of bankruptcies increased from 528 in 1991
to 14,300 (4,400 reorganizations and 9,900 liquidations) in 1992. Cheryl W. Gray, Bankruptcy Law
and Enterprise Restructuring in Central Europe, 4 TRANSITION No. 5, June 1993, at 3 [hereinafter
Gray, Central Europe]. ("Of the 14,300 cases filed in 1992, about 40 percent of the reorganization
cases (approximately one-third of which ended in an approved reorganization plan) and a smaller
percentage of liquidation cases had been concluded by the end of the year."); see Bankruptcies Partly
to Blame for Declining Imports, MTI ECONEWS, May 6, 1993 (15,000 companies had filed for
bankruptcy or liquidation since early 1992); East Europe's Bankruptcy Laws, INDUSTRY WEEK, Apr.
5, 1993 (10% of Hungary's enterprises declared bankruptcy in the first eight months of 1992 and
experts feared that as many as 20% of the Czech Republic's companies might be liquidated once
its law took effect April 20, 1993); Liquidations Predicted Instead of Bankruptcies, MTI ECONEWS,
Apr. 9, 1992 (the number of company liquidations has doubled every year since 1988; in 1991,
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both in the private and public sectors to resolve these situations,' more expeditious
and streamlined procedures are needed than in Western countries with a long
tradition in bankruptcy matters and a manageable volume of cases. 9
1,268 liquidation procedures were initiated in Budapest alone); Bankruptcy Law-One Year On, MTI
ECONEWS, Jan. 20, 1993 ("Hungarian courts handled almost a thousand bankruptcy cases" in 1992).
In Poland, during the first half of 1993, reportedly 2,240 firms went bankrupt. Pawel Wrabec,
Bankruptcy: The Fall Artists, POLISH NEWS BULL., Aug. 13, 1993.
In the Czech Republic, according to the newspaper Cesky Denik:
[As] of February 1, 1994 as many as 1,592 bankruptcy petitions and 10 petitions
regarding property settlement were filed with various regional judicial and commercial
courts. However, only 82 actual bankruptcy proceedings and only one property settle-
ment, were allowed to be initiated by the relevant authorities. In the remaining cases
company managers have responded sufficiently so that petitions were either denied,
dismissed, suspended, repealed, or delegated to another administrative authority.
James B. Varanese & Antje Westphal, Debt-for-Equity: The Czech Republic's Swapping for Survival
Game, 5 SURV. E. EUR. L., Apr. 1994, at I (citing CESKY DENIK, Feb. 18, 1994).
8. In mid-1992, the Budapest court had approximately 4,000 cases but only eight judges handling
them. Gray, Central Europe, supra note 7, at 3. Gray writes:
This surge in cases demonstrates the difficulty of applying the traditional solution-
bankruptcy proceedings-to the systemic problems of enterprise insolvency in CEE
countries. It is highly improbable that any judicial system-much less one with rela-
tively little exposure to economic matters-could handle such a surge in caseload
efficiently and effectively .... Not only are experienced judges in short supply, but
so are qualified trustees. Especially in cases that involve large enterprises, liquidators
have to act as corporate managers and financial managers in order to preserve the assets
of the enterprise and, whenever viable, to encourage settlements between creditors and
debtors. They also need to have legal expertise.
GRAY, EvOLVING LEGAL FRAMEWORKS, supra note 1, at 83-84 (footnotes omitted); see also THE
CASE OF POLAND, supra note 3, at 24-25, 27-28 (discussing capabilities of receivers, judge-
commissaries, judges, courts, and the judicial system in Poland to handle the increasing number of
cases); Bankruptcy Law-One Year On, supra note 7 (noting lack of organizations with experience
relevant for reorganizations).
The demand for western expertise in the fields of accounting, auditing, and business consulting
has been increasing. See Price Waterhouse Ends Successful Fiscal Year in Hungary, MTI EcONEWS,
Jan. 6, 1993.
9. Certain significant procedural steps under the German law appear to be excessively cumber-
some for the Eastern and Central European context. Section 133(2) of the bankruptcy law provides
that if a creditors' committee has been appointed, its approval is required, inter alia, for the trustee
to act on executory contracts, to recognize preferential claims, and to allow the redemption of pledges
when the value of the object is more than three hundred German marks. Konkursordnung, II B 50
(Dec. 1982). These matters are all basic to the administration of a bankrupt's estate, which a trustee
with experience in bankruptcy proceedings should be authorized to decide, to provide for efficient
disposition of the proceeding. Similarly, section 134 provides that the creditors' committee, if ap-
pointed, or if not, the creditors' assembly, must approve the action by a trustee to mortgage assets
of the estate, to borrow on the account of the estate, or to purchase real estate. If these actions are
in the ordinary course of business, the trustee should be able to decide these matters independently.
If there is to be review, the bankruptcy court, rather than creditors' representatives, would appear
to be more qualified to decide on the appropriateness of the trustee's proposed actions.
The time periods for steps in the bankruptcy proceeding stipulated in the German law also are
not appropriate for countries with high inflation, which is prevalent in many economies in transition.
Section 138 provides that the period for the submission of claims by creditors and their examination
can be as long as five months. In this period of time, in countries with high inflation, absent special
provisions, a claim can lose a significant portion of its value, if not become virtually worthless.
The German law also provides in section 146 that in some cases contested claims would not be
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This article compares Czech, Hungarian, and Polish bankruptcy laws in seven
aspects essential for the efficient and fair resolution of business insolvencies: the
definition of insolvency that gives rise to the application of the law; the efficiency
of administration of the insolvency proceeding; whether a proceeding under the
insolvency law stays other debt collection proceedings against the debtor; the
degree of finality of the resolution of claims against debtors; the possibility of
rehabilitation of an enterprise as a realistic alternative to liquidation; the ability
to rescind certain prebankruptcy payments and transfers; and the designation of
priorities in distribution of assets to different types of creditors, including priority
treatment for post-proceeding creditors.
To elaborate on the seven important features of the laws that the article evalu-
ates: The definition of insolvency that triggers action under the law should be
precise and negate attempts of debtors to conceal assets. The administrative proce-
dures in a bankruptcy law should be practical and not too complex. They should
strictly limit the number of opportunities for joint action by the trustee, a creditors'
committee or assembly of creditors, a bankruptcy judge, and the bankruptcy
court. The occasions for appellate jurisdiction should also be limited so as not
to unduly encumber the process. Because the economies in transition lack a
sophisticated bankruptcy bar and judiciary, a relatively large degree of discretion
should be given to a qualified trustee if the system is to be workable. The judiciary
is not likely to be sophisticated in financial matters for several years and even
in the West expertise in commercial matters varies considerably among courts.
A stay of collection actions against a debtor subject to insolvency proceedings
is a desirable result of such proceedings because individual creditors pursuing
individual remedies often decrease the aggregate value of assets available to
creditors generally.
The insolvency law should include the realistic possibility for reorganization
proceedings, whereby an insolvent company's finances are restructured, allowing
the then presumably viable company to continue in business (relieved of some
of its liabilities) and to pay some claims, after confirmation of the plan of rehabili-
tation, from future income. The insolvency law should include more than a general
provision for settlement without requirements for the contents and procedure
for approval of a plan of reorganization, which could relegate the bankruptcy
proceeding to essentially a liquidation procedure. With respect to the resolution
of claims against a debtor, as a collective creditor collection system, bankruptcy
heard by the court before which the bankruptcy proceeding was pending, but rather by another court.
This provision also complicates the conduct of a bankruptcy proceeding. While it may be feasible
in an industrialized country, it would severely test the resources of a country without significant recent
experience in judicial proceedings on insolvency. Indeed, centrally planned economies experience no
business insolvencies since the state pays state-owned enterprises' liabilities. Also under the German
law, the bankruptcy proceeding did not finally settle claims not paid in the proceeding. Section 164(1)
provides that "after termination of the bankruptcy proceedings, the bankrupt's creditors who have
not obtained satisfaction may enforce their claims against the debtor without restriction."
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proceedings should dispose of all creditors' claims, whether they all agree or
not, provided that dissenting creditors receive at least as much as they would
receive in a liquidation. Only in this way can the important benefit perceived in
some countries in bankruptcy proceedings of providing the debtor with a fresh
start be realized. Bankruptcy laws should implement the equitable principle that
similarly situated creditors should be treated alike. Unfair advantages gained by
some because of payments and transfers by the debtor before the bankruptcy
filing, when the debtor may have already been insolvent, or which are gratuitous
or represent a fraud on creditors, should be disregarded. Thus, the law should
contain a broad provision for voiding certain payments and transfers made by
the debtor before commencement of a bankruptcy proceeding.
The law should also clearly state the priorities for distribution of debtors' assets
among several classes of creditors, in addition to the priority that should be
accorded to secured claims to the extent of the proceeds of the collateral security.
This information is important in that it enables potential creditors of enterprises
to know where they would stand in the event of bankruptcy and to price their
financing accordingly. The number of classes of priority creditors should also
be limited so that similarly situated creditors are treated alike. If priority is given
to claims for wages and benefits without limit and to governmental claims for
taxes and social welfare payments, this preference may discourage commercial
credit other than secured financing. However, one class of creditors that should
be given preferential consideration is those who provide credit to a company
after bankruptcy proceedings have been initiated like financial institutions or
suppliers of goods. This type of credit is often vital for a business that has prospects
for restructuring rather than liquidation, since it enables the business to continue
in operation so it can retain suppliers and customers.
The following is an evaluation of the three countries' laws based on these
factors.
I. Evaluation of the Laws Based upon the Seven Features
A. THE DEFINITION OF INSOLVENCY THAT GIVES
RISE TO THE APPLICATION OF THE LAW
The definition of insolvency is key for the laws under consideration because
it may act as a trigger to the application of the bankruptcy law.' 0 If the trigger
is pulled too early, the action may have tragic effects for the debtor who is trying
10. Bankruptcy law in the United States has no requirement of insolvency. A solvent debtor
may voluntarily file for bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. § 101(12) (1993) (defining debtor as a "person or
municipality concerning which a case under this title has been commenced"), id. § 109 (stating who
may be a debtor); and id. § 301 (describing the voluntary filing of a petition). For creditors to file
a petition, the requirements of id. § 303 must be met.
The U.S. Bankruptcy Code contains a good model definition of insolvent, which, in part, provides:
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to save his business. If the trigger is pulled too late, the creditors' rights may
be impaired because the debtor's assets may be depleted.
The Czech law rather imprecisely defines the insolvency that gives rise to a
bankruptcy proceeding under section 1(2) generally as when a debtor is unable
to meet obligations to a number of creditors for an extended period of time.
Under section 4(2), if a debtor has ceased making payments, he is presumed
unable to do so. Thus, this provision leaves room for interpretation at least as
to what period of time is considered extended. " Section 1(3) contains an alterna-
tive test for an individual entrepreneur or for enterprises, which can also be
considered bankrupt if overburdened with debts." Thus, they are subject to an
alternative test of balance-sheet insolvency, while for individuals who are not
business persons the test is failure to meet obligations over a prolonged period
of time. Since balance-sheet insolvency is often difficult to determine because
assets are often overvalued, the inability of a debtor to meet obligations may
become the more important test in practice.
The Polish law also contains two tests for insolvency. First, an economic entity
is to be declared bankrupt when it "has ceased to pay debts."' 3 Second, state
enterprises, cooperatives, limited liability companies, joint-stock companies, or
other legal persons can be declared bankrupt "in cases where their assets do
not suffice to satisfy their debts"-balance-sheet insolvency.' 4 In both cases, a
"short-term suspension of debt payment due to temporary difficulties" does not
give rise to grounds for declaring bankruptcy.'
5
The Polish law provides a time limit within which a debtor must file a bank-
ruptcy petition: "within no more than 14 days from ceasing to pay debts" or
"within 14 days of the disclosure that the assets of the company do not suffice
to satisfy the debts, unless the debtor has presented a petition for opening reorgani-
zation proceedings." 6 If the debtor does not file within the time limit, the judge-
(A) with reference to an entity other than a partnership and a municipality, financial
condition such that the sum of such entity's debts is greater than all of such entity's
property, at a fair valuation, exclusive of-
(i) property transferred, concealed, or removed with intent to hinder, delay, or
defraud such entity's creditors; and
(ii) property that may be exempted from property of the [debtor's] estate.
Id. § 101(32).
11. In practice, it may be the period after which more than two creditors lose patience and decide
to file a petition against the debtor.
12. "Entrepreneur" is defined in § 2(2) of the Czech Commercial Code as a person recorded
in the Commercial Register; a person conducting business activity on the basis of an authorization;
or a natural person engaged in farming and registered as such. Act No. 513/1991 Coll., as amended.
13. PL, supra note 3, art. 1, § 1; see Izabela Sewerynik, Some Problems Regarding Bankruptcy
of Enterprises in the Polish Economy, 9 PuB. ENTERP SE 168 (1989) (encouraging companies to
make technical progress and adopt modern methods of management and financing in order to regain
financial solvency and avoid bankruptcy).
14. PL, supra note 3, art. 1, § 2.
15. Id. art. 2.
16. Id. art. 5, §§ 1, 2.
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commissioner is empowered on these grounds to refuse any reorganization plan
proposed in the future and to impose civil or criminal penalties. 7 A creditor may
also initiate a proceeding at any time.
Previously, the Hungarian law contained a mandatory filing requirement; a
businessman had to declare bankruptcy within eight days of when it would be
impossible to pay a debt within 90 days of the debt becoming due.' 8 This provision
was wisely removed from the law in July 1993.'9 Under the current law, a debtor
may voluntarily file for reorganization or liquidation, but a creditor may file a
petition only for liquidation. 20 The debtor will be found by the court to be insolvent
if: (1) he fails to settle his debts within sixty days of the filing of the petition;
(2) an execution proceeding against him is unsuccessful; or (3) he fails to fulfil
a payment obligation pursuant to a reorganization plan.2'
For bankruptcy laws like those in the Czech Republic and Poland, which do
not have adequate provisions to encourage financial reorganizations,22 the laws
embody, in effect, a policy that promotes liquidations of enterprises because their
liabilities exceed their assets, regardless of the degree of negative net worth and
whether the situation may be remediable. Negative net worth to a small degree
is something the enterprise should seek to correct, in the first instance, rather than
cause the winding-up of an enterprise. Similarly, where laws presume insolvency
when the debtor has suspended payments to creditors, as in the Czech Republic,
the reason for the suspension of payments should be ascertained before a formal
bankruptcy proceeding is initiated, which in these cases favors liquidation rather
than restructuring of enterprises in financial difficulty.
B. THE EFFICIENCY OF ADMINISTRATION OF THE INSOLVENCY PROCEEDING
Another important element of a bankruptcy law is that it provide efficient
methods for both liquidation and reorganization. The law should specify what
court has jurisdiction and provide for specialized courts or divisions that will
handle commercial matters, since modern corporate financial transactions that
are often required in insolvency proceedings in a market economy were not before
the courts in Eastern Europe in the recent past; define and allocate the roles and
17. Id. arts. 5(3), 177(4).
18. Pre-amendment HL, supra note 3, § 9.
19. The mandatory trigger was thought to have been a cause in the high number of cases (over
14,000) filed in Hungary in 1992. GRAY, EVOLVING LEGAL FRAMEWORKS, supra note 1, at 12.
"Because the law came into effect January 1, 1992 and requires reporting after 90 days in default,
there was a particular surge of 3500 filings in April alone-including 2200 reorganization filings
and 1300 liquidation filings." Id. at 83; see Finance Ministry on Bankruptcies and Liquidations, MTI
ECONEWS, June 12, 1992 (in the first four months of 1992 there were 3,045 bankruptcy declarations and
3,898 liquidation declarations).
20. HL, supra note 3, §§ 7, 22, 23(2).
21. Id. § 27(2).
22. See infra text part I.E.
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powers of the court, judges, trustee, and creditors; and limit the number of
decisions subject to appeal.
The Hungarian law sets up no specialized courts to deal with bankruptcy mat-
ters; rather the county court where the debtor has a registered office has jurisdic-
tion.23 However, the statute provides a streamlined process for either reorganiza-
tion or liquidation. A debtor may voluntarily enter reorganization proceedings.24
Alternatively, a debtor or creditor may initiate liquidation proceedings, which
at the debtor's initiative may be terminated because of a compromise agreement.25
The prior version of the Hungarian law attempted to create an efficient bank-
ruptcy process by imposing a series of deadlines on such things as when the
bankrupt must file, when the court must issue writs and decisions, and when a
party may appeal.26 However, many of these deadlines were changed and the
number of occasions for appeal were decreased.27 Moreover, the new version
of the law requires, for the account of the debtor, the appointment of a trustee,
whose role is clearly defined.28 Previously, the trustee was appointed only at the
request of the creditors, who were required to pay the costs of the trustee.29
These improvements should make the process more efficient and the law more
effective.
Under the Czech law, as under the Hungarian law, the regional or municipal
court with jurisdiction over the debtor handles the case. 30 The provisions on
administrative procedures for the bankruptcy proceeding appear to be conducive
to the efficient disposition of claims except where enterprises involved in priva-
tization are concerned. The law does not appear to include too many excessive
or inappropriate procedural measures.
Czech law article 12(1) is a model provision on giving the appropriate degree
of discretion to the court in supervision of the trustee, and article 12(2) denies
any right of appeal against the court's supervision of the proceeding. One peculiar
aspect is the requirement in article 23(2) that creditors whose claims are opposed
by other creditors file separate lawsuits to resolve such claims, rather than resolv-
ing them in the context of the bankruptcy proceeding in which the claim is at
issue. In the case of a claim by the trustee against a creditor, such matter may
be resolved in the bankruptcy proceeding or in another proceeding. 3, These provi-
sions would appear to cause unnecessary delay in the resolution of the bankruptcy
in some cases.
23. HL, supra note 3, § 6(1). This court is referred to in the law as the "Court."
24. Id. § 7(1).
25. Id. §§ 22, 41-45.
26. See Pre-amendment HL, supra note 3, §§ 9, 11, 14, 15(2), 18(3), 19, 21, 24, 27, 31.
27. Compare Pre-amendment HL, supra note 3, §§ 6(3), 11(4), 19(3), 25(2), 27(3) with HL,
supra note 3, §§ 6(3), 21(3).
28. HL, supra note 3, §§ 14-17.
29. Pre-amendment HL, supra note 3, § 14(1).
30. CL, supra note 3, art. 3(l).
31. Id. art. 24(1).
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With respect to enterprises slated for privatization or in the process of privatiza-
tion, recent amendments to the Czech law contain provisions that are complicated
and may be impractical in many cases. The amendments do not appear to fully
distinguish a sale of assets from a sale of an enterprise, how an impending bank-
ruptcy proceeding would affect the prospective investors in a company to be
privatized. A court may stay a request for initiation of a bankruptcy proceeding
against a company involved in privatization for different periods of time, de-
pending upon the stage of the privatization process.
The Polish law contains efficient procedures for the administration of proceed-
ings. It contains straightforward provisions on where the debtor is to file his
bankruptcy petition, what the petition is to contain, and the judicial procedure
for a decision determining the bankruptcy of a debtor.32 Similarly, the liquidation
provisions provide clear roles for the judge-commissioner and the official re-
ceiver, whom the court appointed when bankruptcy is declared.33 The reorganiza-
tion provisions are more problematic, as discussed below, because they provide
for too much court discretion in approving arrangments.3 4 The law allows appeals
on the initial determination of bankruptcy and the final decision regarding a plan
for reorganization."
C. STAY OF COLLECTION PROCEEDINGS AGAINST A DEBTOR
Once a debtor files for bankruptcy, some creditors' sole concern is to satisfy
their claims against the debtor.3 6 The main purpose of an automatic stay is to
32. PL, supra note 3, art. 8 provides:
§ I. Proceedings for the declaration of bankruptcy shall be instituted in the district
court within whose district lies the principal establishment of the debtor, and if the
debtor has several establishments in districts of various courts, in one of those courts.
If the debtor has no enterprise in Poland, the court of jurisdiction shall be the one in
whose district the debtor has his place of residence or principal place of business,
and where the debtor has no place of residence or business headquarters in Poland,
the court in whose district the estate of the debtor is situated shall have jurisdiction
over the case.
§ 2. The power to declare bankruptcy lies with the district court-economic court
consisting of three professional judges.
See id. art. 9 (regarding contents of the bankruptcy petition), art. 10 (providing for hearings), art.
12 (injunctions to protect the estate), art. 13 (dismissal if debtor's assets would not even satisfy the
costs of the proceedings), art. 14 (contents of the declaration). One unusual provision allows the
court to require a creditor, who files a bankruptcy petition, to advance the costs of the legal proceed-
ings; otherwise, the court dismisses the petition. Id. art. 11.
33. See id. art. 14, § 1(3) (bankruptcy petition shall appoint the judge-commissioner and the
official receiver), arts. 87-109. Id. art. 87 provides: "The judge-commissioner conducts the course
of proceedings, inspects the acts administered by the official receiver and specifies the acts the official
receiver must not perform without his special consent or the consent of the committee of creditors."
Id. art. 90 states: "The official receiver, by operation of law, takes possession of the bankruptcy
estate, administers it and conducts its liquidation."
34. Id. arts. 171-201.
35. Id. arts. 17, 192.
36. Some creditors, like suppliers and employees, may also have a strong interest in seeing that
an enterprise remains in business.
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prevent a race by creditors to seize the debtor's assets.37 A stay allows the debtor
and a trustee time to consider alternatives to piecemeal liquidation and it protects
pre-proceeding creditors from each other. It allows the debtor's estate to remain
intact for a period, for a greater value may be realized if the property of the
debtor is sold in whole or in larger parts than would result from piecemeal sales
as a consequence of individual creditors' actions. The law should distinguish
between actions that determine the validity or amount of a claim, which can be
allowed to proceed, 38 and those that execute on assets of a debtor, which should
properly be stayed. The laws in question are not sufficiently precise on this point.
Under the Czech law 39 the initiation of a bankruptcy proceeding stays collection
actions against the debtor. Similarly, according to the Polish law, a declaration
of bankruptcy suspends actions by creditors against the debtor. ° When the court
approves the decision determining bankruptcy, any such actions are discontinued
by operation of law. 4'
According to the Hungarian law, upon commencement of liquidation proceed-
ings, creditors may submit their claims only to the liquidator. However, any
proceedings that started before the announcement of the commencement of the
liquidation proceedings may continue to be heard 2.4 In reorganization proceed-
ings, a stay on the collection of claims does not automatically arise when the
petition is filed. Previously, the Hungarian law provided that for ninety days
after the court's decision announcing the commencement of a reorganization
case, a moratorium was imposed automatically on pecuniary claims against the
debtor.43 Reorganization proceedings were to last less than ninety days; therefore,
the moratorium was a stay on the collection of claims. However, the heavy
caseload of the courts caused delay and in practice debtors were protected for
a much longer period. 4 Consequently, the law was amended and now a debtor
must meet with creditors within fifteen days of filing for reorganization and a
certain percentage of the creditors must agree to a moratorium.45 This provision
obviously increases the pressure on a debtor, who within days of filing a petition
37. In the United States, the stay arises automatically upon the filing of a voluntary, joint, or
involuntary bankruptcy petition. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1993) (also setting forth the scope of the stay,
exceptions to the stay, the duration of the stay, and when a creditor may seek relief from a stay).
38. It may be more efficient to allow the conclusion of a lawsuit on such matters rather than to
have the bankruptcy court consider these matters de novo.
39. CL, supra note 3, art. 14(l)(e).
40. PL, supra note 3, art. 62, § 1.
41. Id. & art. 57, § 1.
42. HL, supra note 3, § 38(2).
43. Pre-amendment HL, supra note 3, § 9. However, there was an expectation for wages, other
benefits, and value added taxes that had to be paid. Id. § 12(2).
44. Smith, supra note 3, at 58.
45. More than half of the parties with claims that have matured by the initial date of bankruptcy
and more than a quarter of the parties with unmatured claims must agree to the granting of a morato-
rium. HL, supra note 3, § 9(4). Furthermore, such claims must total at least two-thirds of the total
creditors' claims, except those to which the moratorium does not apply. Id.
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must be able to convince creditors that the business can be reorganized. A debtor
who files initially for liquidation would get the benefit of the stay and has the
opportunity to reach a compromise agreement with his creditors.46
D. THE DEGREE OF FINALITY OF THE RESOLUTION
OF CLAIMS AGAINST DEBTORS
One of the most important goals of bankruptcy in some countries, namely, in
Anglo-Saxon countries, France, and under the new German law, is providing
the debtor with an opportunity for a fresh start.47 According to this view, the
bankruptcy procedure should settle all claims against the debtor, with limited
exceptions. If the decision does not bind all creditors the value of the process
is impaired from this perspective. In a market economy, entrepreneurial risk is
to be encouraged because successful new business ventures benefit the economy
and society. The penalty of failure should not be so great as to discourage risk-
taking. If a business person will be barred for life from engaging in business or will
never be free of business debts, risk-taking will be limited. In Eastern European
countries, many businesses are in the form of unincorporated single proprietor-
ships. In these countries involvement in bankruptcy proceedings has more conse-
quences for future business activities than in countries in which limited liability
corporate forms of business are more usual.
The Czech law provides that in compulsory settlements and in settlements
satisfied by the debtor, the debtor is relieved of claims not required to be paid
under the terms of the settlement.4" There is no provision, however, on the effect
of a bankruptcy (liquidation) proceeding. In the case of an enterprise, it would
usually be dissolved after a liquidation proceeding, so claims could not be pur-
sued.49 In the case of a sole proprietorship or a partnership, however, the persons
originally responsible for the debt would survive the bankruptcy proceeding, and
46. Id. §§ 41-45.
47. Several provisions of the U.S. bankruptcy code support this goal. Section 522 provides that
certain property of the debtor is exempt from the bankruptcy proceedings. 11 U.S.C. § 522 (1993);
see id. § 727 (stating when a court is to grant the debtor a discharge in liquidation cases); § 1141(d)(1)
(providing that the effect of a confirmation of the reorganization is to discharge debts, unless otherwise
provided in the reorganization plan); §§ 1141, 1328; see also id. § 523 (listing the exceptions to
discharge), § 524 (describing the effect of a discharge). Furthermore, unless it is a case of fraud
or willful injury to a person or property, state constitutions typically prohibit the imprisonment of
debtors. DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., DEBTORS AND CREDITORS 56 (1987). Some Eastern European
nations, which are having problems with con artists who borrow money with the intention of declaring
bankruptcy and then do so, are imposing strict restrictions or criminal sanctions upon a bankrupt.
Pawel Wrabec, Bankruptcy: The Fall Artists, POLISH NEws BULL., Aug. 13, 1993.
48. CL, supra note 3, arts. 42 & 63.
49. In the event that a corporate entity continues, the same ambiguity as with individuals regarding
unsatisfied claims would result. Under U.S. law enterprises are not entitled to a discharge from
unsatisfied debts in bankruptcy proceedings so as to discourage the purchase of bankrupt companies
for their operating losses, which could offset corporate income tax liabilities of the acquiring company.
See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(1) (1993).
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the law should address whether unsatisfied claims against them could be pursued.
To give a fresh start to unsuccessful business ventures, a final settlement of claims
in the bankruptcy proceeding is desirable.
The prior version of the Hungarian law permitted a creditor who did not accept
a reorganization plan to commence liquidation proceedings after ninety days of
the publication of the court decision.5" Consequently, at least in a reorganization
proceeding, the debtor was subject to further assault. This provision was amended,
and now if a certain percentage of creditors approve the plan, all creditors are bound
by it, as long as those not accepting the plan receive equal or better treatment com-
pared to those creditors approving it.5 Thus, this standard of fair treatment for
dissenting creditors is based upon treatment relative to other creditors. Under U.S.
law, for comparison, dissenting creditors must receive at least as much as they
would receive in a liquidation, which presents a more objective standard of fair-
ness.52 The Hungarian statute does not expressly state that all claims against the
debtor are discharged upon conclusion of the liquidation process.
In the Polish law, the liquidation proceedings do not finally settle all claims
against the debtor. Claims not recognized in the bankruptcy action may be brought
against the debtor after the bankruptcy proceedings terminate.53 Certain other
claims may be brought after the bankruptcy proceedings; however, in certain
circumstances, the debtor can file to have them quashed one year after the final
decision by which a bankruptcy proceeding is completed or discontinued. 54 A
court-approved arrangement is binding on all creditors regardless of whether
they submitted claims.55
E. ENTERPRISE REHABILITATION
Among the laws under consideration, Hungary's most strongly encourages
financial reorganization of insolvent enterprises as a serious alternative to liquida-
tion.56 The Hungarian statute's preamble provides that liquidation proceedings
50. Pre-amendment HL, supra note 3, § 20.
51. HL, supra note 3, §§ 19(4), 19(5).
52. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii) (1993).
53. PL, supra note 3, art. 169.
54. Id. art. 170.
55. Id. art, 193.
56. The trend in the last 20 years in mature market economies has been toward reorganiza-
tion in lieu of liquidation. The most extreme example is perhaps the United States,
where Chapter 11 of the Federal Bankruptcy Code gives debtors extensive powers
vis-A-vis creditors to design and implement reorganization plans and thus remain as
going concerns. Germany, in contrast, uses its judicial bankruptcy proceedings almost
exclusively for liquidations, leaving reorganization to pre-bankruptcy workout proce-
dures. . . . At a minimum, to the extent reorganization is included as an option in
the CEE countries, steps should be taken to reduce the power of company managers
and strengthen the voice of creditors, perhaps by imposing strict time limits and/or
allowing the submission of competing restructuring plans.
GRAY, EVOLVING LEGAL FRAMEWORKS, supra note 1, at 11-12 (footnotes omitted).
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are to occur if reorganization is not possible 7.5 This preference for restructuring
is supported by straightforward provisions on how to proceed. Unfortunately,
one drawback to the statute is that creditors, who often know well the prospects
of the business of the debtor, apparently can only file for liquidation of the
debtor, though the debtor may propose a reorganization plan during the liquidation
proceedings.
In Hungary, the reorganization procedure is as follows: after filing for reorgani-
zation, the debtor must hold a meeting of creditors at which time they vote on
whether a stay on collection actions by creditors should be imposed; if the court
approves and grants the stay, the debtor draws up a plan, which must contain
certain specific information for restoring solvency. During the period of the stay,
the debtor must hold compromise negotiations to which the creditors, who must
have already received the plan, must be invited.5 8 Previously, a major fault of
the statute was that all the creditors present at the negotiations had to approve
the plan.5 9 However, the 1993 amendments cured this and now only a certain
percentage of creditors need to approve the plan. 60 Within three days before the
expiration of the moratorium, the debtor must report the result of the reorganiza-
tion negotiations, and if a plan has been prepared, he shall also attach the plan.61
If the plan corresponds with the requirements of the law, the bankruptcy proceed-
ing is to be declared concluded by a court order.62
57. Parliament, in order to reorganize insolvent business organizations through bank-
ruptcy proceedings, and if this is not possible, through a liquidation procedure, to
regulate the final settlement of solvent business organizations about to terminate their
business activities, and to protect the interests of creditors, enacts the following law:
HL, supra note 3, preamble. Still, in 1992, 4,400 reorganization cases, compared to 9,900 liquidation
cases, were filed in Hungary. GRAY, EVOLVING LEGAL FRAMEWORKS, supra note 1, at 83.
58. HL, supra note 3, ch. II. One article on bankruptcies in Hungary notes:
Only the largest suppliers eager to maintain their markets, and powerful banks which
want to improve their portfolios, are actually prepared to help the companies survive,
Istvan Racz, chairman of the Chamber of Liquidators and managing director of Concor-
dat liquidating and consulting company, told Econews.
Normally during bankruptcy proceedings, small creditors' claims, that is claims
under HUF 100,000, are met first in order to reduce the number of creditors and give
larger creditors a better chance to reach an agreement with the debtor company. Also,
in most cases, creditors renounce their claim for interest and agree to reschedule their
debts in the hope that in this way they will recover the principal sum at least.
Mr. Racz says that creditors only occasionally agree to a debt-equity swap perhaps
because they lack sufficient confidence in the company's long-term survival.
Bankruptcy Law-One Year On, supra note 7.
59. Pre-amendment HL, supra note 3, § 17(1). However, this requirement was not applicable
to compromise agreements reached during the course of liquidation proceedings. For such agreements,
at least half of the creditors with claims equal to at least two-thirds of the total claims must approve
the agreement. Id. § 44. Thus, a reorganization plan could have been rejected during the reorganization
stage but approved during the liquidation process.
60. HL, supra note 3, § 19(4); see supra note 45.
61. HL, supra note 3, § 21(1).
62. Id. § 21(3).
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While the insolvency laws of the Czech Republic and Poland are too new to
determine whether the discretion given to courts to reject settlements agreed to
by the debtor and creditors will significantly limit the utility of reorganization
provisions, this outcome is a possibility. Certainly, the arbitrary provisions in
the law of the Czech Republic for a minimum payment of claims by the debtor
to conclude a settlement will restrict the use of reorganizations as an alternative
to liquidation. For example, if, in a reorganization, general unsecured creditors
would receive 20 percent of their claims while in a liquidation they would receive
10 percent, the law should not arbitrarily require that a debtor pay half the amount
of certain claims when the alternative is liquidation. The law should support
creditor democracy-if creditors favor a plan of reorganization that appropriately
treats secured creditors and is not patently unfair to other classes of creditors,
the majority creditors' views should prevail.
Though the Polish law is more tailored towards liquidation proceedings, it
contains a chapter on reorganization, titled "the bankrupt's arrangement with
creditors. -63 However, the fact that secured creditors are not involved in reorgani-
zations diminishes the prospect for their success in many cases. It provides that
after the schedule of debts is drawn up by the judge-commissioner, "the bankrupt
may make an arrangement with the nonpreferential creditors. "64 These are unse-
cured creditors, who must approve the plan "by a majority of the creditors voting
who represent together not less than two-thirds of the value of debts," if there
is no guarantee for the satisfaction of their claims. 65 This initial process appears
to be straightforward, but its utility may also be diminished by the other related
provisions for approval by the court. The judge-commissioner, as distinguished
from the court (as discussed below), must determine whether to approve the
arrangement and apparently can reject it on only two narrow grounds: if it contains
no arrangement proposals (which probably means that the plan is proposed to
delay the liquidation proceedings and is not a realistic reorganization plan); or
63. PL, supra note 3, ch. VH, arts. 171-201; see id. art. 14, § 1(3) (providing for the appointment
of the judge-commissioner and official receiver). Also, Poland's Law on Financial Restructuring of
Enterprises and Banks, supra note 3, has provisions whereby "creditor banks that initiate bankruptcy
proceedings against a defaulting debtor are granted a special status to implement restructuring arrange-
ments, including debt-for-equity swaps, even before full privatization. The Czech Bankruptcy Act
grants creditor banks no such special status, and generally delays recapitalization until after privatiza-
tion." Varanese & Westphal, supra note 7, at 11. These analysts note that the financial restructuring
law is "a hybrid bankruptcy privatization tool: because the debt-for-equity swaps transfer state-owned
shares to private hands, the twin goals of recapitalization and privatization are achieved with one
stroke." Id.
64. PL, supra note 3, art. 171. In the case of state enterprises petitioning to make an arrangement
with creditors, the petition may include a "demand to have the arrangement proceedings preceded
by a public invitation for tenders as to the further running of the enterprise, its transformation or
utilization of its productive capacity." Id. art. 175a.
65. Id. arts. 174, 185.
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if the bankrupt is barred from entering into such an arrangement. 66 The decision
of the judge-commissioner to permit the bankrupt to make the arrangement is
not subject to appeal.67
According to the Polish law, once a plan is approved by the creditors, the
court, in addition to the judge-commissioner, must also approve the arrangement,
unless: (a) it contravenes the bankruptcy law; (b) the creditor's vote was somehow
manipulated (for example, creditors were given inappropriate information regard-
ing the future prospects of the reorganized business); (c) the arrangement "con-
flicts with decency or public order;" or (d) the "the conditions are too disadvanta-
geous to the creditors who have voted against the plan." 68 Any creditors objecting
to the plan may complain at a hearing. 69 These provisions introduce too much court
discretion. A better approach would be to establish fair and objective confirmation
rules, with the creditors having the power of decision. The court's decision is
subject to appeal. 70 Once the court's approval of the plan is final, in the future,
the plan may be set aside on only two grounds: the conviction of the debtor for
fraudulently hiding assets from creditors; or the debtor's failure to abide by the
terms of the plan.
The law of the Czech Republic provides both for settlement and for compulsory
settlement of creditors' claims, which could have the effect of establishing a
reorganization.72 The procedure for settlement arises outside the context of a
bankruptcy proceeding, whereby the debtor is protected from creditors' claims
while the debtor continues its business activity with a view to restructuring its
finances so that the business can continue. Relieved of some portion of its debts,
the business gains a chance to prosper in the future. The possible involvement
of a trustee in a settlement proceeding is unclear.
66. Id. art. 176. Certain bankrupts may not enter into an arrangement. These include: bankrupts
who have declared bankruptcy within the last five years, bankrupts who have already been party
to an arrangement, bankrupts who have not maintained books as required, bankrupts who have
unconscientiously kept their books, bankrupts who did not file a bankruptcy petition within the
prescribed time limit, and bankrupts who have refused to cooperate in establishing the financial
condition of the bankruptcy estate. Id. art. 177.
67. Id. art. 178.
68. Id. arts. 189-192.
69. Id. art. 189.
70. Id. art. 192.
71. Id. arts. 197-201.
72. CL, supra note 3, arts. 34-43, 46-66. Two analysts of the Czech bankruptcy law noted:
Often debtors utilize the limited time available prior to the court's formal declaration
of bankruptcy to directly negotiate with creditors a mutually acceptable financial re-
structuring. Prior to the court's formal declaration, the debtor may request and receive
a protection period of three to six months or longer. The protection period has a
special legislative purpose: to protect newly privatized companies during their birthing
period. Within this protection period, the debtor has a reprieve from the formal declara-
tion of bankruptcy proceedings that permits the negotiation of a financial restructuring
package acceptable to both debtor and creditor.
Varanese & Westphal, supra note 7, at 9.
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A settlement proceeding would arise before the court issues a bankruptcy order
and is proposed by a debtor who would qualify for bankruptcy proceedings; that
is, it meets one of the insolvency tests.73 For an entrepreneur the proposal for
a settlement apparently must include a reorganization plan.74 The filing of a
proposal by the debtor suspends the debtor's rights, inter alia, to transfer property,
incur new debt, or otherwise impair the rights of creditors, so the conduct of
business as usual is restricted.7 5 In a settlement, preference is given to governmen-
tal claims and employee claims, as in compulsory settlements.76 A court can
accept or reject the proposal. However, the court must reject the proposal if it
determines that the nonpriority creditors have not been offered at least 45 percent
of their claims to be paid within two years of the filing of the proposal.17 The
creditors are entitled to make proposals as to the terms of a settlement and creditors
whose rights are impaired vote on whether to accept the settlement.78
The criteria in the law for the court to determine whether a proposed settlement
can go forward introduces some rigidity into the system with respect to priority
claims and minimum payments for nonpriority claims, which is undesirable. The
creditors as a whole should determine whether they would be better off in a
settlement rather than in a prospective liquidation. While priority creditors would
perhaps be better off in a liquidation if sufficient assets are available to satisfy
their claims, the law should not implicitly favor liquidations if prospects are good
for rehabilitation of a business. Thus, the court should not reject settlement
proposals because they do not meet arbitrary guidelines.
Similarly, in regard to confirmation of settlements, a court may refuse to
confirm settlements agreed by the creditor and debtor if in the opinion of the
court "the advantages to the debtor . . . are at considerable variance with his
recognized financial status" or if the settlement is too disadvantageous to the
dissenting creditors.79 Again, the court should not substitute its judgment for that
of the parties to the proceeding, especially on such indefinite criteria, since the
alternative in many cases would be liquidation.
The Czech law provides that the debtor may propose a compulsory settlement
after the court reviews the validity of claims, to conclude a bankruptcy proceed-
ing.8 0 A majority of the creditors representing three-quarters of the claims must
approve the proposal.8 Such settlement precludes the liquidation of assets in
73. CL, supra note 3, art. 46(1). "Entrepreneur" is defined in § 2(2) of the Commercial Code.
74. Id. art. 46(3).
75. Id. art. 49(1).
76. Id. art. 54.
77. Id. art. 50.
78. Id. art. 58. While id. art. 58(b) stipulates which creditors are entitled to vote on a settlement
proposal, the votes needed to accept the proposal are not stated. Presumably, the same rules apply
as for compulsory settlements. Id. art. 38(1).
79. Id. art. 61(2)(a), (c).
80. Id. art. 34. The review hearings are described in arts. 20-25.
81. Id. art. 38(1).
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the bankruptcy proceeding and therefore provides a method for a business to
reorganize, albeit after the disruption caused by the intervention of a trustee and
a cessation of normal business operations for some period of time. The court
must reject a settlement proposal if it involuntarily impairs the rights of secured
creditors.8 2 This provision is an important impediment to reorganizations, espe-
cially as secured credit becomes more widely used as the money and capital
markets develop. As in the disappointing experience in Germany with concordats,
if secured creditors' claims may not be deferred, there may be no practical alterna-
tive to liquidation in many cases in which reorganizations would otherwise be
desirable. The law provides that the court shall reject a proposal for a compulsory
settlement, inter alia, if the costs of administration or claims of employees are
not paid in full 3 or if at least one-third of nonpriority claims are not scheduled
to be paid within one year.S8 These are other arbitrary obstacles to reorganizaion
and are not consistent with solutions to enterprise financial distress used in the
West. The court must also consider whether such settlement would sanction the
debtor's "dishonest or carefree management of his economic affairs" and if so,
reject the settlement.8 5 The introduction of this value judgment also does not
appear to be helpful.
Amendments to the Czech law enacted in April 1993 provide for a period of
three to six months' protection for a debtor, after a creditor has requested the
initiation of bankruptcy proceedings.8 6 During the period the court will not for-
mally initiate bankruptcy proceedings. Within this protected period, the debtor
must "make continuous efforts" to rehabilitate its affairs, 7 and a settlement
according to the provisions of the bankruptcy law could be proposed.88 Creditors
during this period may not make claims on debtors, with the exception of employee
claims and those in relation to tax and social and health insurance.8 9 It is unclear
whether the debtor's business could be conducted to enhance the prospects for
rehabilitation during this period. Article 5d(d) provides that "actions taken by
the debtor which infringe on the interests of the creditors . . . are ineffective."
The law should make explicit that actions in the ordinary course of business such
as purchasing supplies and selling inventory are permissible, and that a creditor
who extended any new credit to the debtor would have high priority in any
liquidation. Otherwise, a debtor would find it difficult to implement a plan of
rehabilitation other than through retrenchment.
82. Id. art. 36(a).
83. Id. art. 36(b).
84. Id. art. 40(l)(e).
85. Id. art. 40(1)(f).
86. Act No. 122/1993 Coll.
87. Id. art. 5d(e).
88. Id. art. 5d(f). If a statement is proposed by the debtor during the protection period, it will
not end before the court decides on the proposal.
89. Id. art. 5d(b).
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All the countries could strengthen their reorganization provisions in different
degrees by adopting certain measures similar to those used in countries where
enterprise reorganizations have had an extensive history, like France and the
United States, to make reorganization a more meaningful alternative to liquida-
tion. The law could provide for the expeditious consideration of whether the debtor
may continue to conduct its business, pending determination of the feasibility of
a reorganization plan.' With regard to settlement proceedings commenced after
bankruptcy proceedings have begun, the disruption to the business of the debtor
may have irreparably harmed the prospects for rehabilitation because important
suppliers and customers may be lost. The law could also contain a provision to
enable widely held companies to organize committees of equity holders, in addi-
tion to creditors' committees, which would consider the advisability of the contin-
ued existence of a troubled enterprise. 9' The law could empower both types of
committees, or the court, to engage professionals like attorneys, accountants,
and investment bankers to appraise the desirability of the continuance of certain
facets if not all of the business of the debtor and formulate a plan of reorganiza-
tion. 92
The law could also contain a list of possible specific elements of a plan of
reorganization, to stimulate consideration of alternative means to restructure the
finances of the debtor. This specificity would be particularly helpful in Eastern
Europe, which is embarking on a new era of financial restructuring of enterprises
for a market economy. Such measures could include: the modification of rights
of holders of claims, both secured and unsecured; the sale of substantial parts
of the debtor's assets; the merger or consolidation of the debtor with another
enterprise; the issuance of securities of the debtor for cash, for existing securities,
or in exchange for other claims; and the amendment to the debtor's charter to
provide for new classes of voting securities with preferences with respect to
ordinary dividends and liquidation distributions.93 The law should require that
interested parties' acceptance or rejection of the plan be based on adequate infor-
mation and that they receive a disclosure statement. 94 To induce negotiations on
the terms of a proposed reorganization plan in countries that have had no recent
tradition in this area, the law could also provide for the submission of counter-
offers at different time intervals. Such provisions should stimulate the creative
efforts of interested parties and their advisors.
To favor the reorganization rather than a liquidation of an enterprise as a matter
of policy, the law can remove some discretion from the interested parties with
respect to a reorganization plan where they are deemed to be treated fairly. Thus,
90. Loi No. 85-98 du 25 Janvier 1985, relatif au redressement et A la liquidation judicaires des
enterprises art. 8, J.O. 1097 (26 Janvier 1985) [hereinafter French Law No. 85-98].
91. See 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(2) (1994).
92. See French Law No. 85-98, supra note 90, art. 10; 11 U.S.C. §§ 1103(a), (c)(2) (1994).
93. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1123(a)(5), (6), 1123(b) (1994).
94. See id. § 1125(b).
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the law could provide that creditors who dissent will be considered to have
accepted a plan if they will receive or retain under the plan property of a value
that is not less than they would receive or retain if the debtor were liquidated. 95
Such value could be in the form of deferred cash payments over a period not
exceeding a specified number of years, and to address inflation, the imputed rate
of interest could be subject to indexation.
F. AVOIDANCE OF PRE-BANKRUPTCY TRANSFERS
As a matter of fairness to creditors and in order not to discourage them from
extending credit, the law should provide that certain payments by a debtor to
creditors during some period before the bankruptcy proceeding will be null and
void. 6 Transfers and payments other than in the ordinary course of business or
in which there is a contemporaneous exchange for new value should be subject
to avoidance. This provision would allow a debtor's business to receive supplies
and to sell output. Certain other payments and transfers would become part of
the debtor's estate, to be apportioned among all creditors, or to be used as assets
in a reorganized business. As a general principle of equitable treatment of all
creditors, debtors should not be able to choose who will get paid in full and who
in part or not at all. Nor should creditors be able to exert undue pressure for
payment from a financially distressed business.
None of the laws under consideration contain broad provisions that void unfair
preferences given to creditors within a certain time period before bankruptcy.
Some laws void transfers made gratuitously or to relatives, or security interests
given, or payments by way of settlement, but no broad provision applies.
The Hungarian law contains a simple provision allowing a creditor or liquidator
to challenge certain preliquidation contracts and transfers.97 Furthermore, in the
hierarchy of claims, secured debts are given priority, unless the security was
pledged less than six months before the starting of the liquidation process, in
which case the claim is apparently included with unsecured claims.98
The Polish law contains several provisions voiding pre-bankruptcy transfers. 99
All "gratuitous acts" done within one year of the bankruptcy petition have "no
effect upon the bankruptcy estate."" Also, all pledges of security and payments
95. See id. § 1129(a)(7).
96. In the United States, two uniform laws, adopted in many of the states, protect creditors from
fraudulent transfers of property. Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, 7A U.L.A. 427 (1985); Uniform
Fraudulent Conveyance Act, 7A U.L.A. 639 (1984). Furthermore, the trustee is given power to
avoid certain pre-petition transfers. 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547-548 (1994).
97. HL, supra note 3, § 40.
98. Id. § 57(l)(b).
99. PL, supra note 3, ch. IV (Ineffectiveness of and Action Against the Bankrupt's Acts), arts.
53-58.
100. Id. art. 53, § 1.
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of debts that have not fallen due within two months of the petition are void. 10
Moreover, creditors apparently have the power to file an appeal against the
bankrupt's acts that are prejudicial to them.' 0 The law also contains a provision
whereby the debtor's contracts with certain extended family members within six
months preceding the presentation of the bankruptcy petition have no effect upon
the bankruptcy estate. 103
Under the Czech law, security interests granted to creditors within two
months before the date of the receipt by the court of the petition to initiate
formal proceedings become void.'°4 In the case of a protective proceeding
under Czech law article 5a, which can ordinarily last for up to six months,
or nine months in the case of an agricultural production business, 05 any prefer-
ences granted to some creditors during this period are subject to rescission.
Collusive actions in the past three years by the debtor and third parties with
the intention to impair the rights of creditors are also voidable.' 06 These partial
provisions appear to be equitable, as they afford equal treatment to some
similarly situated creditors. However, the law has no general provision in
the law for treating similarly creditors who receive payments shortly before
bankruptcy and those that do not.
G. PRIORITIES IN DISTRIBUTION OF ASSETS
To implement the basic precept of insolvency law that similarly situated
creditors should be treated equally, an insolvency law should not contain too
extensive a hierarchy of priority classes of claims in regard to the distribution
of a debtor's assets in liquidation. The laws in question generally accord too
many priorities to employee, tax, and social welfare payment claims. The
legislatures appear to have assumed the existence of a law of equity as to
which creditors should be paid preferentially. Yet in the transition to a market
economy, where the extension of commercial credit is vital, especially in the
absence of other significant sources of business finance, the law should not
discourage general creditors, who are disadvantaged when several other
classes of claimants are given priority.
Among unsecured claims, all the laws give priority of payment of claims
from the proceeds of the estate to administrative expenses of the bankruptcy
proceeding, which is appropriate. Indeed, if a trustee is not assured that costs
and fees of the administration of the estate will be paid, the bankruptcy proceed-
101. Id. art. 53, § 2. A creditor, who was not aware of the existence of the grounds of bankruptcy,
may request that the payment or security be declared valid. Id.
102. Id. art. 55.
103. Id. art. 54.
104. CL, supra note 3, art. 14(1)(f).
105. Id. art. 67c.
106. Id. art. 15(2). There are also provisions in Criminal Code § 256 for preferential transfers.
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ing may not be responsibly administered. Employee and government claims
are generally next in payment priority. Highest priority is accorded to secured
claims in all countries except Hungary, where administrative costs take prece-
dence.'O7 The claims with such priority are for the amount realized from the
collateral security. Any remainder due becomes an unsecured claim.
Only the Czech law appears to give priority to those who provide credit
after the commencement of a bankruptcy proceeding. Omission of this priority
diminishes the prospects for restructuring of some enterprises because they
will have to curtail business activities that depend on new credit.'OS Few enter-
prises in bankruptcy will be able to give security for new credit, especially since
in these countries, receivables are generally not used as a form of asset-based
financing. The laws also have no limits on payment of claims for compensation
to managerial or other highly compensated officers or employees of enter-
prises. This lacuna creates a moral hazard, and limits on payment of such claims
could instill more managerial discipline that would prevent some insolvencies.
In Hungary, in compromise agreements, the creditors may agree on the
order in which debts will be satisfied. 109 As for liquidations, the statute provides
a specific order for the payment of debts: liquidation costs (which include
employee severance pay); 10 certain secured debts, wages, and employee bene-
fits; "claims by private persons deriving from noneconomic activities"; social
security obligations and taxes; other claims; and finally, interest and penal-
ties."'
The Polish law provides the following priority for claims to be satisfied out
of the bankruptcy estate: costs of the proceedings, which, curiously, include
wages and pension payments owed by the debtor; claims incurred by the official
receiver; taxes for a period of two years prior to the declaration of bankruptcy;
social insurance payments for a period of one year prior to the declaration of
bankruptcy; other claims plus interest for one year prior to the declaration of
bankruptcy and contractual damages and related costs; other interest; penalties
107. The supremacy of secured creditors is important to the flow of credit in the economy.
In the new Hungarian law, these rules of priority are shifted to place the claims of
workers for salaries and severance pay (considered here as liquidation costs) above
that of secured creditors. This is likely to dampen the incentives of secured creditors to
initiate bankruptcy, reduce the role of banks in enterprise restructuring, and ultimately
constrain the development of secured credit as a financial instrument.
GRAY, EVOLVING LEGAL FRAMEWORKS, supra note 1, at 12.
108. However, the Polish law gives some preference, after administrative claims, to new credit
that was provided in the context of a failed reorganization attempt, as "claims generated from the
bankrupt's acts carried out with permission of the court supervisor or by the supervisor's acts in
the course of arrangement proceedings, which were completed or discontinued within three months
preceding the declaration of bankruptcy." PL, supra note 3, art. 203(1).
109. HL, supra note 3, § 43.
110. Id. § 57(2).
111. Id. § 57(1).
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and fines; donations and bequests.1"2 The law also states that to the extent a
secured creditor's debt is not satisfied by his mortgage or lien, that amount shall
not be included in the list of claims to be satisfied out of the estate. 113 Apparently,
debts secured by mortgages and liens are given absolute priority, though this
question is currently being debated in Poland.
In the Czech Republic, priority is accorded first to claims related to the adminis-
tration of the estate, and then to employees' claims for three years prior to the
bankruptcy (so-called first class claims). 114 Next, are governmental claims for
taxes, fees, duties, and social security contributions within three years prior to
the bankruptcy and in the course of the bankruptcy, which are called second class
claims." Other nonpriority claims are third class claims. Claims not recognized
include interest on creditors' claims, both pre- and post-bankruptcy, and extra-
contractual penalties."l6 It appears that the priority accorded to disputed claims
that are ultimately upheld is the priority they would have received had they not
been contested. Funds are set aside to cover contingent claims. "' The Czech law
in article 33(2) states that these claims will be paid according to a" new distribution
schedule." With respect to the treatment of credit provided after the initiation
of bankruptcy proceedings, 118 claims with respect to post-proceeding credit are
first class claims. " 9 Thus, reorganizations may be facilitated by the debtor's
receiving new credit, since such creditors may be encouraged by the priority
accorded to their claims.
II. Conclusion
This article has shown the ways in which laws of three Eastern European
countries deal with important aspects of insolvency legislation. The early experi-
ence with these laws shows that some provisions can predominate compared to
others. In Hungary, the early experience shows that reorganizations have been
undertaken to a significant degree. Similarly, the number both of reorganizations
and liquidations in Poland is on the rise. In the Czech Republic, the very early
experience is that the administrative framework is inadequate to resolve the vol-
ume of cases filed.
Since the state is still the owner of the vast majority of large enterprises and
banks in these countries, the use of insolvency laws has been tempered by the
112. PL, supra note 3, art. 203(2).
113. Id. art. 207.
114. A recent amendment to the law provides in art. 67a that claims of management personnel
shall have priority only up to the amount of kc 10,000 per month; any excess will be treated as a
nonpriority claim.
115. CL, supra note 3, art. 32.
116. Id. art. 33(1).
117. Id. art. 33(2).
118. See id. art. 52(2) regarding restrictions on creating new liabilities in a settlement proceeding.
119. Id. arts. 31(2), 32(1).
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natural reluctance of governments to cause disruption in employment. When more
private interests obtain ownership of enterprises, the new adversarial relationships
will undoubtedly cause an increase in the number of involuntary initiations of
insolvency proceedings. As these bankruptcies proceed, the bankruptcy courts
and private sector professionals will develop more expertise to improve the effi-
ciency of the process. The laws may be amended to remedy provisions and
procedures that have proven impractical. Then, in the countries whose laws
provide a fair opportunity, the prospects for successful reorganizations may im-
prove.
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